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Abstract: this paper analyzes the singularities inherent to the financial industry, 
in relation to other businesses, and its implications to financial crises throughout  
history. The efficient markets hypothesis is questioned, and its impact on the de-
regulation of the financial system is analyzed. Finally, the causes of the current 
crisis are investigated, and the general lines to be addressed for the redesign of a 
financial system to achieve an efficient and equitable capitalism are suggested. 
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1.1 The Singularities of the Financial System 
The financial system is made up of institutions, most of which are privately owned 
and pursue profits. They are regulated by government agencies (Central Banks, 
more or less independent from national governments). If a financial institution 
fails, it can endanger the entire system, or a significant part of it (systemic risk). 
That gives this business a very singular nature (Acharya, 2010), which does not 
occur in any other industry. The bankruptcy of a company, either in the automo-
tive sector (e.g. General Motors), energy sector (e.g. Enron), oil industry (e.g. 
Texaco), telecommunications (e.g. WorldCom), aeronautical industry (e.g. United 
Airlines), etc., does not involve a risk to the overall economy. On the other hand, 
these failures are inscribed on what the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter 
called "creative destruction": the shareholders of the failed companies have to bear 
the losses, and other investors eventually will buy the businesses or their assets. It 
is the essence of capitalism that makes it both efficient and equitable. But in the 
financial sector the situation is very different. The high price volatility of financial 
assets is very important to monitor, particularly by regulators, as it may be the 
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primary cause of financial asset bubbles that cause instability and adverse effects 
on economic activity. Hence, the importance of fixing efficiently the asset prices 
in the financial markets. Financial institutions receive the money, usually on a 
short term basis, from economic units with surplus cash. On the other hand, this 
money is offered to businesses or families in need of credit, for investment in pro-
ductive projects, the purchase of real estate, homes, etc., providing loans typically 
at longer term. In this way they perform a risky quantitative and qualitative trans-
formation of the financial resources received. This mutation of short-term funds 
into long-term resources involves a relevant singularity inherent to the financial 
system. In certain circumstances, it can trigger a financial crisis. Also, unlike other 
industrial companies that trade with goods and services, financial institutions deal 
with trust assets, which have an intangible support: trust. These singularities of the 
financial system make it very vulnerable to crisis situations and throughout history 
government institutions (Central Banks, Deposit Insurance, etc.) have been created 
to deal with this. Those institutions have helped to give some stability to the sys-
tem.  
However, the crises have not disappeared, and the mechanisms used to overcome 
them have opened up many questions. Some of them have to do with the high 
costs of the bailouts undertaken by the taxpayers, the increase of moral hazard in-
duced in the system and its consequences in the creation of future crises, the lack 
of "sanctions" for managers, directors and shareholders of the financial institutions 
rescued, etc. So, the basic principle of capitalism, the appropriation of both gains 
and losses, has been changed into a very different one: the appropriation of profits 
with an unacceptable socialization of losses. To support that, it has been argued 
that crises are unpredictable, as a phenomenon of nature. This argument pretends 
to justify the exemption from liability of bankers and regulators. In 2009 the CEO 
of Goldman Sachs, Lloyd Blankfein made a request to American congressmen to 
"avoid a response designed to protect us only against one of those extraordinary 
storms that happen only every hundred years". However, the successive financial 
crises that have plagued capitalist economic history have shown that far from be-
ing an unusual situation, as a "black swan" (Taleb, 2007), crises are more common 
than previously thought. We should call them "white swans" (Roubini and Mihm, 
2010). Some have even gone so far as to argue that the crisis is in the genome of 
capitalism. In his way, that was what Schumpeter maintained. The historical evi-
dence for this argument is relevant: from the speculative bubble of tulips in Hol-
land in 1630, to the crisis of U.S. trusts in 1907, to the Great Depression of 1930 
and to the current crisis in the first decade of the 21st century. In all these cases a 
similar pattern was found, shattering the myth of crisis unpredictability. Quite the 
contrary, a careful study must be done of the circumstances in which events hap-
pened to identify the causes of the recent crisis. Moreover, some proposals to re-
form the current financial system to prevent crisis in the future should be attempt-
ed as well. 
 
1.2 The teachings of the Financial Crisis 
The recent financial crisis triggered a global economic collapse, but it also put in a 
"crisis" situation the economic science itself. From its origins, Economics strug-
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gles to be a science. In the last century, trying to emulate the elegance and infalli-
bility of the natural sciences, it was equipped with equations, mathematical mod-
els, etc.. But behind this facade of “one scientific truth”, there is a tremendous di-
versity of conflicting views, especially regarding the controversial issue of 
financial crises. The study of how and why markets collapse has recently been 
named as "Economy Crisis". It is a complementary and very different way of con-
ventional economics, which is devoted to show how and why markets work, and 
the reason why they do it well. In the origins of the profession, we find Adam 
Smith's "invisible hand" as its first and greatest exponent. But Smith did not rec-
ognize the many vulnerabilities of capitalism. In the next century, many econo-
mists reviewed and refined the ideas of Smith. In fact, there was consensus on the 
economy of the XIX century, around the idea that markets were basically self-
regulated, always moving towards a quasi-magical balance. Many economists (Ri-
cardo, Say, Walras and Marshall) improved Smith´s vision and began to build the 
mathematical structure to prove their arguments. Faith in the basic stability of 
markets led to an important corollary: if markets can be self-regulated and their 
collective wisdom is always right, then the price of the assets purchased and sold 
on the market are accurate and justified. Based on the work of the French mathe-
matician Louis Bachelier they attempted to validate mathematically this theo-
ry. They would demonstrate the absence of the concept of undervalued or over-
valued assets, or what is the same: the market is a perfect reflection of the 
underlying fundamentals. Empirically, it was clear that asset prices change, often 
dramatically, but always it would be a rational and automatic response to the arri-
val of new information. The evidence of the Great Depression should have put an 
end to these doctrines, but the academic departments of Economics and Finance 
breathed new life into that old fallacy. In the University of Chicago professor Eu-
gene Fama and other proponents of liberal policies began to develop complex 
mathematical models in order to demonstrate that markets are fully rational and 
efficient. Many economists supported this thesis in the postwar years, and recog-
nized that markets can be more or less efficient depending on certain varia-
bles. But the central idea remained an axiom in the business schools and in the de-
partments of Economics and Finance. In the early 1970s, the efficient market 
hypothesis had become a widespread belief, with enormous impact on the formu-
lation of government economic policies and deregulation of financial markets.  
However, not everyone subscribed it. The most radical criticism came from the 
Yale economist Robert Shiller. In the early 1980s, through a rigorous statistical 
analysis, Shiller conducted a research which showed that prices of shares on the 
stock market show much more volatility than the efficient market hypothesis 
could explain. At the end of the decade, he and other critics had compiled a spec-
tacular collection of data showing that the price of the assets are rarely held con-
stant in an equilibrium state, but shifted without control or order. One day inves-
tors can react with excessive optimism and the next day give way to panic and 
abandon the assets at bargain prices. These oscillations are not rational. They are 
irrational impulses of the masses (Shiller, 2003). But one thing is questioning the 
myth of the efficient market, and another quite different is to explain precisely 
why markets are inefficient. This task was done by professionals of new fields, 
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halfway between Economics and Psychology: Behavioral Economics and Behav-
ioral Finance. New models of human psychology in relation to financial markets 
were developed. Recent research in this field has contributed to better understand-
ing of the phenomena of creation and bursting of asset bubbles and financial pan-
ic. The Feedback Theory is based on "fundamentals of human behavior," accord-
ing to Shiller. One fundamental is the "self-attribution bias" (Kent, Hirshleifer and 
Subramanyam, 1998), whereby investors engaged in a speculative bubble do not 
attribute the increased profits to the fact that they and thousands of other equally 
naïve, take part of the bubble deceit, but to his own smartness. A series of biases, 
misrepresentations and other trends often feed irrational speculative bubbles and 
the particular justifications that inevitably accompany them, especially the belief 
that the old rules of business are no longer in force, and now "the economy has en-
tered a new era". In short, capitalism does not seem to be a self-regulated system, 
but rather is prone to bouts of "irrational exuberance", alternating with unfounded 
pessimism, making it extremely volatile and unstable.  
This had already been anticipated by the post-Keynesian economist Hyman Min-
sky, who devoted his life to create a theoretical structure on the foundations of 
J.M. Keynes theories. Minsky focused on various forgotten chapters of Keynes's 
General Theory, referring to banks, credit and financial institutions, and synthe-
sized them with other concepts of Keynes Treaty of Money, concluding that the 
"financial instability is intrinsic and endogenous to the capitalist system". This ap-
proach represented a stark contrast to the economics profession in the postwar era: 
in the equations and models used by the architects of the so-called neoclassical 
synthesis, had little place -if any- for banks and other financial institutions, despite 
their failure could collapse the economic system as a whole. Minsky proposed to 
change the situation by demonstrating how banks and other financial institutions 
became increasingly complex and interdependent, and could lead the whole econ-
omy towards collapse. The focus of his analysis was the debt: how it is accumu-
lated, distributed and valued. This raised the Financial Instability Hypothesis 
(Minsky, 1982), classifying debtors of the economy into three categories, depend-
ing on the type of financing used: covered, speculative and Ponzi debtors. The 
first ones are those who are able to satisfy both principal and interest on their debt, 
the second ones only the interest having to refinance the capital, and the third ones 
are the most unstable because they are unable to pay neither interest nor capi-
tal. Minsky noted that during a speculative boom, the amount of debtors covered 
decreases, while speculative and Ponzi debtors increase. During the boom period 
the price of assets (e.g. house prices) goes up and all borrowers are driven to take 
on even more debt. As the volume of unpaid debt shoots at full speed, the proba-
bility of the system to suffer a financial catastrophe increases. The trigger of the 
crisis is almost irrelevant. It could be the bankruptcy of a company, the discovery 
of fraud, or just a sudden loss of confidence in the future. When the pyramid of 
debt begins to crumble and credit crunch happens, we are in the beginning of the 
financial crisis.  
Of all crises, the Great Depression of 1930 has left the most teachings. Its legacy 
has allowed now, eighty years later, to qualify the crisis we are currently suffering 
as "only" a "Great Recession". The period between both events was named as the 
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"Great Moderation": controlled inflation and sustained economic growth (Gali and 
Galimberti, 2009). In the Great Depression, with unemployment rates of 25%, 
mass bankruptcies of banks and companies, the thesis of "laissez-faire the liquida-
tors" supported by the U.S. Treasury Secretary Mellon, and President Hoover, was 
clearly inefficient. It was not until the arrival of President Roosevelt and his New 
Deal -inspired by the ideas of Keynes- who with strong government intervention, 
was able to escape from the Great Depression (Romer, 2009). However, some re-
searchers have given the main credit for the economic recovery to the Second 
World War. Others have questioned the effectiveness of the medicine recom-
mended by Keynes and have attributed to the poor performance of the Federal Re-
serve the fact that the crisis has reached the size of tragedy (Friedman and 
Schwartz, 1963). Figure 1.1 shows how since the government raised its stake in 
the economy in the 1970’s, and since it uses monetary and fiscal policy to smooth 
economic cycles, the volatility of GDP has fallen exponentially. Even the current 
Great Recession crisis seems insignificant compared with the Great Depression. 
 
  
Figure 1.1 Volatility of U.S. GDP from 1920 to 2010 
 
At the outbreak of the recent crisis of the early XXI century, the Federal Reserve 
and other global central banks have acted decisively to prevent the "liquidity trap" 
of the Great Depression, obtaining acceptable results in the short term. Neverthe-
less, the long-term costs remain to be seen (Bernanke, 2009). Unfortunately, after 
the postwar period the teachings of Keynes fell into disfavor. Part of the mistake 
may be in the biased interpretation of Keynes ideas: it is true that in times of fall-
ing aggregate demand to increase public spending is recommended, but it is also 
true that in times of economic boom the reservoirs of the public treasury should be 
filled, in anticipation of future crises, in order to maintain a balanced budget in the 
long term. Policy makers often enthusiastically adhere to the first part of the rec-
ommendation, forgetting the second part. With the rise of the paradigm of the Ef-
ficient Market Theory, the regulations established after the Great Depression to 
provide financial stability was dismantled step by step. The suppression of the 
Glass-Stegall Act, which stated the careful separation of the commercial banks 
from the investment banks and many other wise regulations are a good example of 
these policies. 
 
1.3 The genesis of the Great Depression of the early XXI century 
The origins of the current crisis are in the so-called Great Moderation period fol-
lowing the oil crisis of the seventies. As was already said, the prevailing economic 
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theory from the 1970s postulated that efficient markets self regulate themselves, 
so government intervention should be limited to a minimum, and crises were a 
strange phenomena that belong to the history of developed countries, and in the 
future eventually will only affect the emerging economies. This state of the art 
coupled with the economic interests of the financial market players create a mech-
anism that finally burst in the early third millennium. The deregulation of financial 
markets resulted in increased systemic risk, due to the concatenation of a diverse 
array of factors. One was the creation, through mergers and acquisitions, of global 
financial institutions (assumed to be "too big to fail"), which eventual bankruptcy 
would put at risk the system as a whole. In case of a crisis, the regulator would be 
trapped in the following dilemma: either let the financial institution in trouble drop 
to bankruptcy as it would be technically prescribed, assuming the risk of putting 
the whole system at the expense of collapse, or rescue it solving the problem in the 
short term, but increasing the so-called moral hazard and induced risk (transmit-
ting the message to the market that in the future, any institution in a similar situa-
tion should be rescued, which would not be worth to act prudently). The long-term 
negative consequences are evident (Dowd, 2009). Another consequence of the de-
regulation of the system was what Paul McCulley named "Shadow Banking Sys-
tem" (McCulley, 2009). The shadow banking system includes financial institu-
tions that appear to behave as banks, but paradoxically are not regulated like 
banks. The problem is that this status allowed financial institutions to venture into 
off-shore vehicles, off-balance businesses, and taking great risks. In the shadow 
there are no capital requirements and the financial institutions, through qualifying 
assets with the help of rating agencies at the highest credit quality, and with high 
levels of debt and high leverage, made the financial system too vulnera-
ble. Financial institutions found a mechanism for generating endogenous liquidity, 
outside the central banks control. In our country, the Bank of Spain banned bank-
ing assets off balance and consistent practice of selling fully associated risk 
through asset securitization to unwary investors. However, the extreme accessibil-
ity of wholesale funding helped to leverage the banking system. This helps to ex-
plain the credit crunch and the worst recession in Spain since the 1940s. Other fac-
tors caused that the financial market has become extremely complex and 
vulnerable: the financial system agents, seeking to maximize their profits in the 
short term, led them to create business models that proved to be extremely dan-
gerous to the health of the whole system. The way in which commercial banks 
granted mortgage loans to insolvent customers, how investment banks abused of 
financial engineering, and the way how rating agencies created AAA titles 
which finally ended up in investment portfolios worldwide, shows the way to dis-
aster. A perverse bonus system for bankers, with incentives and rewards for short-
term results, knowing that in the long term the system would eventually collapse, 
is behind this problem (Rajan, 2005). These wrong incentives, combined with ex-
cessive leverage allowed to take deposit funds with government-guarantee to play 
them in risky ventures. At the end all this led to a situation in which the risks are 
outside financial institutions, held by unsuspecting investors. If the crisis happens 
the subsequent bailout and its costs are assumed by the defenseless taxpayers. 
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1.4 Redesigning the Financial System 
At this point, we are in the worst scenario: many financial institutions have been 
rescued and are confident that it will happen again in future crises. They had not 
faced any significant regulatory scrutiny and there is no system that can declare a 
state of insolvency if necessary. It is essential to try to redesign a financial system 
with appropriate incentives to serve the goal of "refunding capitalism" with solid 
foundations, to reach its relevant and strategic social function. The problems to be 
addressed are multiple and complex, and will have perhaps the opposition of fi-
nancial institutions that will try by every means to maintain the privileges of the 
current status-quo. The main issues to be addressed are: 
 
- The establishment (or reestablishment) of legislation which clearly separates the 
business of commercial banking (taking deposits and lending) from investment 
banking (securitization, leverage, etc.), establishing "Chinese walls" between 
them, preventing the "regulator's dilemma" that is doomed to rescue speculative 
bets of investment banks, to avoid damaging the rightful interests of depositors of 
commercial banks. 
- Specific regulation for hedge funds, preventing their funding in the commercial 
banking system (with government guarantee of deposits), being allowed only for 
high risk investors (speculators). 
- Simplification of securitized financial products, in order to allow proper valua-
tion of the underlying investment risk. 
- Reform the business model of the Risk Rating Agencies, to solve the current 
problems of conflict of interest (to collect fees from the issuers and act both as 
consultants and qualifiers), promoting the emergence of qualified competitors in 
this field. 
- Promote the "Schumpeterian Creative Destruction". In particular, to address the 
reorganization of institutions deemed "too big to fail". 
- Avoid the so-called "Regulatory Arbitrage" that is the avoidance of regulatory 
standards, creating ad-hoc legal structures. 
- Rebuild and reorganize the structure of regulation, prioritizing the work of offic-
ers in charge of carrying it out, improving their remuneration and social status. 
 
As Lloyd Blankfein, CEO of Goldman Sachs, maintained, bankers deserve their 
huge compensations as they perform the "work of God." This remarks caused out-
rage, particularly in those who were losing their jobs or their houses by the col-
lapse of the financial system. Another approach should be taken: paraphrasing 
Georges Clemenceau, we could say that "Banking is too important to be left to 
bankers". Capitalism has a fundamental rule: there should be no profit without 
risk. If the risk of a business is so high that in case of bankruptcy it could jeopard-
ize the viability of the capitalist system as a whole, the logic conclusion that fol-
lows is that this business can only be assumed by society as a whole (the taxpay-
ers). Does it make sense then that such activity is held in private hands? Is it not a 
flagrant contradiction of the current status-quo that, while in times of crisis finan-
cial institutions are unable to bear the losses inherent to their activity and had to be 
bailed out by the taxpayers, in the good times they do not give up to their profits 
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or share their benefits with the society? We will have to consider whether compa-
nies that would have gone bankrupt without the help of taxpayers, deserve to con-
tinue being a "hunting ground" of short-term speculators.  
It is convenient to mention Schumpeter once more, as an exponent of the Austrian 
School of Economics, which is characterized by a deep skepticism of government 
intervention, both fiscal and monetary policy. Just as it seems clear that in the 
short term Keynesian prescriptions were effective in preventing the collapse of 
capitalism, it is also true that in the medium and long term the proposals of 
Schumpeter can be very useful. As mentioned, Schumpeter developed a powerful 
theory of entrepreneurship that is often summarized with the words: "Creative De-
struction". In the long run, it is imperative that insolvent banks, businesses and 
families go to bankruptcy. Keeping them alive is extending the problem indefinite-
ly. Minsky (1982) pointed out that to solve a financial crisis in the medium and 
long term requires that everyone (families, companies and banks) reduce their in-
debtedness. To socialize debts, through endless government bailouts, is unsustain-
able, unfair and immoral. The successful resolution of the crisis in which we are 
now immersed, depends heavily on a pragmatic approach that incorporates the 
idea of 
	"creative destruction". The priority issue of our time is how to 
manage this task.  
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